A Privacy-Preserving Traffic Monitoring Scheme via Vehicular
  Crowdsourcing by Zhang, Chuan et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
2.
04
66
3v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
2 F
eb
 20
19
A Privacy-Preserving Traffic Monitoring Scheme via
Vehicular Crowdsourcing
Chuan Zhanga, Liehuang Zhua,∗, Chang Xua,∗, Xiaojiang Dub, Mohsen
Guizanic
aBeijing Engineering Research Center of Massive Language Information Processing and
Cloud Computing Application, School of Computer Science and Technology, Beijing
Institute of Technology, Beijing, China.
bDepartment of Computer and Information Sciences, Temple University, Philadelphia,
USA.
cCollege of Engineering, Qatar University.
Abstract
The explosive growth of vehicle amount has given rise to a series of traffic prob-
lems, such as traffic congestion, road safety, and fuel waste. Collecting vehicles’
speed information is an effective way to monitor the traffic condition and avoid
vehicles being congested, which however may bring threats to vehicles’ location
and trajectory privacy. Motivated by the fact that traffic monitoring does not
need to know each individual vehicle’s speed and the average speed would be
sufficient, we propose a privacy-preserving traffic monitoring (PPTM) scheme
to aggregate vehicles’ speeds at different locations. In PPTM, the roadside
unit (RSU) collects vehicles’ speed information at multiple road segments, and
further cooperates with a service provider to calculate the average speed infor-
mation for every road segment. To preserve vehicles’ privacy, both homomorphic
Paillier cryptosystem and super-increasing sequence are adopted. A comprehen-
sive security analysis indicates that the proposed PPTM can preserve vehicles’
identities, speeds, locations, and trajectories privacy from being disclosed. In
addition, extensive simulations are conducted to validate the effectiveness and
efficiency of the proposed PPTM scheme.
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1. Introduction
Nowadays, the number of global vehicles has exceeded 1.2 billion and may
be headed to 2 billion by 2035 [18]. With such a massive amount of vehicles,
many critical social problems, such as traffic congestions and slow traffic, have
emerged, leading to significant time and fuel waste. According to a report
released by Harvard Center, for the drivers in 10 most-congested cities in USA,
more than 48 hours are wasted in traffic jams, causing $121 billion loss in time
and fuel every year [13]. To deal with these critical problems, both industry
and academia are paying great attention to traffic monitoring, and vehicular ad
hoc network (VANET) is considered as one of the most promising way that can
be leveraged in traffic management [20, 1].
In VANETs, vehicles, embedded with onboard units (OBUs), can share traf-
fic information (e.g., locations and speeds) to the roadside units (RSUs) through
vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications, and nearby vehicles by vehicle-
to-vehicle (V2V) communications [29]. By collecting and analyzing these traffic
information, vehicles can easily know different locations’ traffic conditions and
road safety, and accordingly plot out their optimal routes. Recently, several
VANET-based traffic monitoring applications have been built. For example,
Google and Apple provide real-time navigation services based on current traf-
fic information [21]. Waze has developed an application that can help drivers
get the best route with real-time help from other drivers [19]. Although many
benefits can be brought by this emerging network paradigm, its flourish still
hinges on how to resolve security and privacy concerns for the drivers. Since
a vehicle’s location is tightly bundled with its driver, an attacker can predict
a driver’s future location based on his vehicle’s trajectory, or even infer the
driver’s personal information, such as habits, health condition, wage income,
religious belief, according to its frequent visiting places.
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Figure 1: Using passing time to link pseudonyms
To preserve the vehicles’ privacy, pseudonyms and anonymous authentication
are two effective ways to conceal vehicles’ real identities and realize conditional
privacy preservation [25, 27, 12, 7]. For example, Ni et al. [14] proposed a
privacy-preserving real-time navigation system by collecting vehicles’ location
and speed information, and with the randomization technique, the sensitive
identity privacy is preserved. However, the work in [10] showed that user iden-
tities can sometimes be inferred from the location data if users’ home and work
locations are deduced from the data. Moreover, we observe an attack that by
linking vehicles’ speed information, vehicles can also be identified even if they
change their pseudonymous. An example is illustrated in Fig. 1. At time t1,
a vehicle provides its speed information PIDA||v1||L1||t1 to a roadside unit
(RSU), and at time t2, it uploads another speed information PIDB||v2||L2||t2,
where v denotes the average speed in the road segment, L denotes the location,
and t represents the current time. Although the vehicle’s pseudonym is changed
(i.e., PIDA → PIDB), attackers can still link the pseudonyms by comparing
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the estimated passing time 1 and actual passing time (i.e., t2 − t1) between
these two locations. Thus, there still lacks a privacy-preserving traffic moni-
toring scheme which can protect the vehicles’ identities and defend against the
linkable attack.
In this paper, to deal with the above challenges, we propose a privacy-
preserving traffic monitoring (PPTM) scheme to enable vehicles provide their
traffic information while not sacrificing their privacy. This scheme uses the ho-
momorphic Paillier cryptosystem to guarantee the privacy of vehicles’ speeds,
and adopts a well defined super-increasing sequence to not only protect vehicles’
location privacy, but also save tremendous computational costs and communi-
cation overhead. Our main contributions can be further summarized below.
• First, inspired by the fact that traffic monitoring does not need to know
each individual vehicle’s speed and the average speed would be sufficient,
we propose PPTM which uses the super-increasing sequence and homo-
morphic Paillier cryptosystem to realize privacy-preserving speed aggre-
gation and efficient traffic monitoring. Concretely, each vehicle uses a well
defined super-increasing sequence to aggregate its multiple speeds and en-
crypts the aggregated result before uploading to the RSU. Then, the RSU
will aggregate all reports and cooperate with a service provider to calcu-
late different road segment’s average speed. During this process, vehicles’
identity, speed, and location privacy will not be disclosed to any other
party.
• Second, we find that the anonymous technologies such as pseudonyms
and randomizable signature are not suitable for certain VANET-based
applications because of the time link attack. To mitigate this attack, we
design a privacy-preserving data aggregation approach. Through a com-
prehensive security analysis, the proposed PPTM is proved to be secure
1The average passing time can be calculated by using the distance and average speed. The
distance from L1 to L2 can be obtained from GPS.
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and privacy preservation. Particularly, the proposed scheme can achieve
report privacy preservation, report authentication and data integrity, iden-
tity preservation, and can also defend against the collusion attack. The
detailed analysis is given in Section 5.
• Third, we conduct extensive simulations to show PPTM is practical and
efficient. Compared with a traditional baseline scheme, PPTM can signif-
icantly reduce computational costs and communication overhead, indicat-
ing that the proposed scheme can indeed realize real-time traffic monitor-
ing.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the
system model, security requirement, and design goals of the proposed PPTM
scheme. In section 3, preliminaries including bilinear pairings and Paillier cryp-
tosystem are introduced. The detailed introduction of PPTM is given in section
4. In section 5 and section 6, we analyze the security and performance of PPTM
respectively. In section 7, some related works are listed, and we draw our con-
clusion in section 8.
2. System Model, Security Requirements, and Design goals
In this section, we formalize the proposed scheme by giving the system
model, threat model, and design goals.
2.1. System Model
In the proposed PPTM scheme, roads are divided into multiple segments
and vehicles are expected to provide their average speed for each segment they
have passed through. A typical RSU-assisted VANET application is illustrated
in Fig. 2. In particular, the considered system model consists of the following
entities.
• Trust authority (TA): TA is a fully trusted entity which is responsible for
the registration of vehicles and RSUs. It builds public/secret key pairs for
5
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Figure 2: Using trust values to link pseudonyms in a given period of time.
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all entities, and generates sufficient pseudonyms for vehicles before their
next registration.
• Vehicles: All vehicles are embedded with onboard units (OBUs) which
enable them communicate with RSUs and surrounding vehicles through
wireless communications. Besides, they also have the ability to generate
and run their own homomorphic cryptosystem.
• Roadside units (RSUs): RSUs act as the role of access points which are
widely deployed in the urban area. They can communicate with vehicles
via wireless communications and the service provider by wired communi-
cations.
• Service provider (SP): SP is a centralized entity which is responsible to
provide traffic monitoring services. It connects with all RSUs through fast
communication technology, such as wired cables.
2.2. Security Requirements
In our security model, TA is fully trusted as it is responsible to initialize the
whole system and generate credentials and public/private keys for all partici-
pating entities. SP and RSUs are considered to be honest-but-curious, which
means both of them will strictly follow the designed protocol, but are curious
about vehicles’ privacy. In particular, we assume there is no collusion between
SP and RSUs, which is similar to most existing RSU-assisted scenarios [28, 26].
Meanwhile, we assume that vehicles will provide correct speed information to
the RSU. This assumption is reasonable in most traffic monitoring scenarios,
since 1) the speed provided by vehicles is in the area where they have passed
through, and providing false data would not benefit them, and 2) vehicles want
to know the correct traffic conditions, and thus will honestly follow the designed
protocol for their mutual benefits. Besides, we also assume there exists an at-
tacker which is curious about drivers’ privacy. It may launch attacks, modify
speed reports, and threat data integrity. Based on the above assumptions, the
proposed scheme should achieve the following security requirements.
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Identity Privacy Preservation. As described earlier, an attacker can poten-
tially identify drivers even though they adopt pseudonyms and anonymous au-
thentication. Thus, to preserve drivers’ identity privacy, attackers cannot infer
vehicles’ location information (i.e., road segments) based on the given data.
Location Privacy Preservation. Since the speed is location-aware, preserving
drivers’ location privacy requires preventing their speed from being disclosed.
Hence, the proposed scheme should ensure that even if the RSU or an attacker
receives a vehicle’s speed information, it cannot recover its speed and further
infer its location privacy.
Data Integrity. An attacker may eavesdrop drivers’ reports and modify them
for its benefits. Thus, the proposed scheme should guarantee data integrity and
any malicious operations should be detected.
2.3. Design goals
Based on the aforementioned security requirements, our goal is to design
a privacy-preserving traffic monitoring scheme, which enables vehicles upload
their speeds towards the RSU securely and efficiently. Concretely, the proposed
scheme should achieve the following two design goals.
The defined security requirements should be guaranteed. If the proposed
scheme fails to realize the aforementioned security requirements, drivers’ identity
and location privacy may be disclosed, and data reports transmitted to the RSU
or other vehicles may be modified. Then, vehicles may be reluctant to provide
their speed, and traffic conditions will not be accurately estimated.
High efficiency should be guaranteed. To provide real-time traffic monitor-
ing, vehicles are expected to upload speed information in a short transmission
interval. However, to preserve drivers’ privacy, the sensitive information should
be encrypted, which may introduce tremendous computational costs and band-
width consumption for the resource-constrained vehicles. Thus, the proposed
scheme should achieve high efficiency in computational costs and communication
overhead.
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3. preliminaries
In this section, we review the pairing-based cryptography [4] and the Paillier
cryptosystem [15], which serve as the basis of our proposed traffic monitoring
scheme.
3.1. Bilinear Pairings
Suppose there are two cyclic groups G1 and G2, both of which share a same
order q. Then, a bilinear map e : G1 ×G1 → G2 has the following properties.
• Bilinearity: e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab ∈ G2, for all P,Q ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Z
∗
q .
• Non-degeneracy: e(P, P ) 6= 1, for all P ∈ G1.
• Computability: e(P,Q) can be efficiently computed, for all P,Q ∈ G1.
By referring to [2, 24], we give two more comprehensive definitions for bilin-
ear pairings.
Definition 1. Given an input security parameter κ, Gen is a probabilistic al-
gorithm to output a 5-tuple (q, P,G1,G2, e), in which q is a κ-bit prime, P
is a generator, (G1,G2) are two cyclic groups sharing a same order q, and
e : G1 × G1 → G2 is an efficient, computable, and non-degenerated bilinear
map.
Definition 2 (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem). Given el-
ements (P, aP, bP ) ∈ G1, there exists no effective algorithm can calculate abP ∈
G1 for unknown a, b ∈ Z
∗
q in a probabilistic and polynomial time.
3.2. Paillier cryptosystem
As an effective technology to achieve homomorphic properties on the cipher-
texts, Paillier cryptosystem has been widely used in various privacy-preserving
applications. Concretely, three algorithms are included in the Paillier cryptosys-
tem.
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• Key Generation: With a security parameter κ1, select two large κ1-bit
primes p1, q1, and calculate n = p1q1 and the least common multiple of
p1 and q1, i.e., λ = lcm(p1, q1). Then, define a function L(a) =
a−1
n
,
and calculate µ = (L(gλ mod n2))−1 mod n2, where g ∈ Z∗n. Then, the
public/private keys are pk = (n, g) and sk = (λ,mu).
• Message Encryption: Given a plaintext m ∈ Zn, after choosing a random
value r ∈ Z∗n, the message is encrypted as c = E(m) = g
m · rn mod n2.
• Ciphertext Decryption: Given a ciphertext c = E(m) ∈ Z∗n2 , the message
is recovered as m = D(c) = L(cλ mod n
2
) · µ mod n.
Note that, Paillier cryptosystem has been proven to be correct, secure, and
effective against the chosen plaintext attack [15]. Moreover, Paillier cryptosys-
tem allows arithmetic operations on ciphertexts, such as E(m1) · E(m2) =
E(m1 +m2) and E(m1)
a = E(a ·m1), for all (m1,m2) ∈ Z
∗
n.
4. Proposed PPTM Scheme
In this section, we will give the details of the proposed PPTM scheme
which includes system initialization, speed request and speed reporting, privacy-
preserving report aggregation, secure report reading, and traffic guidance and
identity tracing.
4.1. System Initialization
TA initializes the whole system. After selecting two security numbers κ, κ1,
it first runs Gen(κ) to generate a 5-tuple (q, P,G1,G2, e) and calculates pub-
lic/private keys of the Paillier cryptosystem, i.e., pk = (n, g), sk = (λ, µ), ac-
cording to κ1. Then, TA selects a secure cryptographic hash function H , where
H : {0, 1}∗ → G1. Vehicles are required to register themselves at set inter-
vals. TA chooses a secure key k0 and generates a secure symmetric encryption
algorithm AESk0 . For every registered vehicle with its real identity number
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IDi
2, TA generates a group of pseudonyms {PIDij = AESk0(IDi||xij)}
n
j=1
by choosing a set of random values {xij}
n
j=1 ∈ Z
∗
q . Then, TA uses xij as each
vehicle’s certified public key and calculates the corresponding private key as
Yij = xijP . For each RSU with its identity number IDr, TA selects a random
number xr ∈ Z
∗
q as its public key and calculates the private key as Yr = xrP .
Hence, TA sends {{PIDij, xij , Yij , }
n
j=1, (P,G1,G2, e,H), (n, g), (IDr, Yr)} to
each vehicle, {(n, g), IDr, xr, Yr} to each RSU, and (λ, µ, (IDr, Yr)) to SP.
In addition, in the coverage of a RSU, roads are divided into multiple seg-
ments. Assume that the maximum number of segments within the coverage of
each RSU is M , the number of vehicles in every segment is no more than Q,
and the maximum speed in every road segment is smaller than V . Then, for
the segments located in each RSU’s coverage, TA generates a super-increasing
sequence −→a = (a1, a2, · · · , aM ), where ai denotes the i-th segment such that
a1 ∈ Z
∗
n is randomly chosen,
∑j−1
i=1 ai · Q · V < aj for j = 2, 3. · · · ,M , and
∑M
i=1 ai ·Q · V < n.
4.2. Speed Request and Speed Reporting
Fig. 3 illustrates the system procedure of PPTM. As can be seen, RSU first
generates a speed request and all vehicles response it by providing their driving
reports. Specifically, the request contains the RSU’s id, the current timestamp
TS, time range TR, and the signature σr = xrH(IDr||TS||TR). Note that,
the timestamp is used to defend against the replay attack launched by other
forged RSUs. Then, the RSU broadcasts the request Rr = IDr||TS||TR||σr
to vehicles driving in its communication coverage. After receiving this re-
quest, vehicles first verify the report by examining whether e(P, σr) equals to
e(Yr, H(IDr||TS||TR)). If the equation holds, the request will be accepted,
since e(P, σr) = e(xrP,H(IDr||TS||TR)) = e(Yr, H(IDr||TS||TR||)).
If the request is valid, vehicles are expected to provide their speed reports.
The format of speed is defined as {(Ai(j), Si(j))}
M,V
i=1,j=1, where ti(j) denotes
2The real ID can be license number or social secure number.
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Figure 3: System procedure of PPTM
the time passing by the i-th segment for the vehicle Vj , and {Ai(j), Si(j)} are
calculated as follows,


Ai(j) =


1 if Vj has passed by the segment i
0 if Vj has not passed by the segment i
Si(j) =


vi(j) if Vj has passed by the segment i
0 if Vj has not passed by the segment i
where vi(j) is Vj ’s average speed when passing by the segment i. For example, if a vehi-
cle’s speed report is expressed as {(5, 1, 50), (0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0), (3.5, 1, 75), (2, 1, 60)},
this means that during the past 10.5 minutes the vehicle has passed by the segment
1, 5, and 6, with the average speed as 50, 75, and 60. Then, given a time range as
8, the vehicle should submit the speed report {(3.5, 1, 75), (2, 1, 60)} as 3 + 2.5 < 8.
To preserve the privacy of location and speed privacy, the report should be encrypted
before uploading to the RSU. The vehicle Vj selects two random values rj1, rj2 ∈ Z
∗
n
and calculates the ciphertexts as Cj1 = g
(a1·A1(j)+···+aM ·AM (j)) · rnj1 mod n
2 and
Cj2 = g
(a1·S1(j)+···+aM ·SM (j)) · rnj2 mod n
2. Then, the vehicle signs the report with
its secret key and timestamp by computing σj = xjH(PIDj||Yj ||Cj1||Cj2||TS). After
that, Vj delivers the speed report Rj = PIDj ||Yj ||Cj1||Cj2||TS||σj to the RSU.
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4.3. Privacy-Preserving Report Aggregation
Upon receiving the report, RSU first checks the freshness of this report, i.e., to
make sure that the difference between request and request is within a certain range.
Then, the RSU verifies the vehicle’s report by examining e(P, σj)
?
= e(Yj,H(PIDj ||Yj ||Cj1||Cj2||TS))
as e(P, σj) = e(xjP,H(PIDj||Yj ||Cj1||Cj2||TS)) = e(Yj ,H(PIDj||Yj ||Cj1||Cj2||TS)).
Especially, to improve efficiency, RSU can perform batch verification to check whether
e(P,
∑N
j=1 σj)
?
=
∏N
j=1 e(Yj ,H(PIDj||Yj ||Cj1||Cj2||TS)), where N is the number of
vehicles passing by every segment. The proof is given below.
e(P,
N∑
j=1
σj) =e(P,
N∑
j=1
xjH(PIDj||Yj ||Cj1||Cj2||TS))
=
N∏
j=1
e(P, xjH(PIDj||Yj ||Cj1||Cj2||TS))
=
N∏
j=1
e(Yj ,H(PIDj||Yj ||Cj1||Cj2||TS)).
(1)
By performing this operation, fewer time-consuming pairing operations e(·, ·) are re-
quired (i.e., 2N vs. N + 1).
After checking the validity of vehicles’ reports, the RSU executes the following
steps to obtain the aggregated results in a privacy-preserving way.
• Step 1. Calculate the aggregated results C1 and C2 based on the encrypted data
13
{Cj1}
N
j=1 and {Cj2}
N
j=1 as follows.


C1 =
N∏
j=1
Cj1 mod n
2
=
N∏
j=1
g
a1·A1(j)+···+aM ·AM (j) · rnj1 mod n
2
= g(a1
∑N
j=1 A1(j)+···+aM
∑N
j=1 AM (j)) · (
N∏
j=1
rj1)
n mod n2
C2 =
N∏
j=1
Cj2 mod n
2
=
N∏
j=1
g
a1·S1(j)+···+aM ·SM (j) · rnj2 mod n
2
= g(a1
∑N
j=1 S1(j)+···+aM
∑N
j=1 SM (j)) · (
N∏
j=1
rj2)
n mod n2
(2)
• Step 2. Use the secret key xr to generate a signature as
σr = xrH(IDr||C1||C2||TS). (3)
• Step 3. Send the aggregated and encrypted data IDr||C1||C2||TS||σr to the SP.
For ease of understanding, we give an example to show how aggregated vehicle and
speed are aggregated, as shown in Fig. 4. The RSU receives the ciphertexts of four
speed reports {R1, R2, R3, R4}, each of which contains four segments. After performing
the aggregations, the aggregated results of vehicle and speed are the ciphertexts of
ai
∑4
j=1Ai(j) and ai
∑N
j=1 Si(j) respectively, where i ∈ [1, 4]. In the following, we
will show how to recover the aggregated vehicle and speed for every segment.
4.4. Secure Report Reading
On receiving the aggregated report, SP first checks data validity by examining
e(P, σr)
?
= e(Yr,H(IDr||C1||C2||TS)), and then performs the following steps to recover
the aggregated results from the ciphertexts,
• Step 1. Considering M1 = a1
∑N
j=1A1(j) + · · · + aM
∑N
j=1AM (j), M2 =
a1
∑N
j=1 S1(j) + · · · + aM
∑N
j=1 SM (j) and R1 =
∏N
j=1 rj1, R2 =
∏N
j=1 rj2, the
aggregated ciphertexts C1 = g
M1 · Rn1 mod n
2, C2 = g
M2 · Rn2 mod n
2 are still
14
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Figure 4: Traffic aggregation example in PPTM.
valid ciphertexts of Paillier cryptosystem. Hence, the SP can use the secret key
(λ, µ) to obtain M1 and M2 as


D(C1) = a1
N∑
j=1
A1(j) + · · ·+ aM
N∑
j=1
AM (j) mod n
2
D(C2) = a1
N∑
j=1
S1(j) + · · ·+ aM
N∑
j=1
SM (j) mod n
2 (4)
• Step 2. SP then invokes algorithm 1 to recover the aggregated routes (L1, L2, · · · , LM )
and speed (LS1, LS2, · · · , LSM ), where Li =
∑N
j=1 Ai(j) and LSi =
∑N
j=1 Si(j),
i ∈ [1,M ].
The correctness of Algorithm 1. For ease of description, we use the aggregated routes to
give the correctness analysis. In this algorithm, LM = a1
∑N
j=1A1(j)+a2
∑N
j=1A2(j)+
· · · aM−1
∑N
j=1 AM−1(j) + aM
∑N
j=1AM (j). As the number of aggregated vehicle in
every segment is smaller than Q, we have
a1
N∑
j=1
A1(j) + · · · aM−1
N∑
j=1
AM−1(j) < (a1 + · · ·+ aM−1) ·Q
=
M−1∑
i=1
Q < aM .
(5)
Hence, LM−1 = LM mod aM = a1
∑N
j=1A1(j) + · · · + aM−1
∑N
j=1AM−1(j), and
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Algorithm 1: Recover the aggregated report
Input: D(C1), D(C2) and
−→a
Output: {Li}
M
i=1 and {LSi}
M
i=1
1 Set LM =
∑M
i=1
∑N
j=1 aiAi(j) mod n
2,LS =
∑M
i=1
∑N
j=1 aiSi(j) mod n
2;
2 for i =M,M − 1, · · · 2 do
3 Li−1 = Li mod ai, Li =
Li−Li−1
ai
; LSi−1 = LSi mod ai,
LSi =
LSi−LSi−1
ai
;
4 L1 =
L1
a1
; LS1 =
LS1
a1
;
5 return {Li, LSi}
M
i=1
accordingly we have
LM −LM−1
aM
=
aM
∑N
j=1 AM (j)
aM
= LM . (6)
Following the similar analysis, Li =
∑N
j=1 Ai(j) can be proven. Also, we can prove
LSi =
∑N
j=1 Si(j), as it shares the similar procedure as Li.
4.5. Traffic Guidance and Identity Tracing
After calculating the aggregated route and speed in all segments, i.e., (L1, L2, · · · , LM )
and (LS1, LS2, · · · , LSM ), the average speed in each segment can be computed as
Li =
LSi
Li
. At last, SP broadcasts the speed information and vehicles can select op-
timal routes based on the road conditions. In addition, although we assume that all
vehicles report their speeds honestly, some vehicles may still upload false traffic data.
In this case, the TA can periodically select some speed reports stored in the RSU
and recover them to check whether they are truth or not. Since vehicles’ pseudonyms
are generated by using vehicles’ real identity ID, malicious vehicles can be easily and
quickly identified.
5. Security Analysis
In this section, we give the security analysis of the proposed PPTM scheme. In
particular, recall the aforementioned security requirements, the analysis will focus on
how our proposed PPTM scheme can protect each vehicle’s report privacy, ensure
16
report authentication and data integrity, and achieve vehicles’ identity and location
privacy preservation.
The proposed scheme can achieve report privacy preservation. The proposed scheme
preserves reports’ privacy by using the Paillier cryptosystem. In PPTM, vehicle Vj ’s
location and speed are formed as Cj1, Cj2. Since both ciphertexts are valid ciphertexts
of Paillier cryptosystem and the Paillier cryptosystem has been proven to be secure
under the chosen plaintext attack, the messages are secure and privacy-preserving.
That is, although an adversary may eavesdrop a ciphertext, it cannot recover the cor-
responding message. After receiving all reports from vehicles, instead of recovering
each report, the RSU will perform report aggregation and deliver the aggregated ci-
phertext to the SP. Thus, even though SP holds the secret key, it can only obtain the
aggregated result. Therefore, each individual vehicle’s report is privacy-preserving in
the proposed PPTM scheme.
The proposed scheme can achieve report authentication and data integrity. In our
proposed scheme, vehicles’ reports and RSU’s aggregated report are signed using BLS
short signature [5]. Since it has been proven that BSL short signature can defend
against the CDH problem [3], our proposed scheme can guarantee the report authen-
tication and data integrity, and any malicious behavior on the vehicles’ reports will be
detected.
The proposed scheme can protect vehicles’ identity privacy. In our proposed scheme,
vehicles periodically update their pseudonyms from TA. By changing pseudonyms, ve-
hicles are able to keep themselves anonymous. Moreover, the proposed scheme is also
effective to defend against the possible link attack presented in [10], since each vehicle’s
route (i.e., road segment) is aggregated and encrypted. By this way, attackers cannot
infer where vehicles have been based on the given data, and accordingly cannot link
their identities. Besides, although SP can obtain the aggregated route information,
it is infeasible for it to recover each individual vehicle’s route. Therefore, vehicles’
identity privacy is preserved in the proposed PPTM scheme.
The proposed scheme can protect vehicles’ location privacy. In our proposed scheme,
vehicles’ location privacy is preserved by aggregating their route reports. Considering
the speed is location-aware, attackers may infer vehicles’ locations based on the speed
information. In this case, our proposed scheme is still effective, since in PPTM each
individual speed is also aggregated and encrypted. Similarly, since all speed reports
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are also aggregated in the RSU, SP cannot obtain each individual vehicle’s speed
information. Thus, vehicles’ location privacy is preserved.
The proposed scheme can resist collusion attacks. The basic idea to mitigate col-
lusion attacks is to ensure the separation of data between different entities. In PPTM,
with the assumption that RSU does not collude with SP, neither of them can know
each individual vehicle’s privacy. More specifically, the RSU cannot know vehicles’
reports since they are encrypted by using the SP’s public key. The SP can decrypt the
summation of vehicles and speed in each segment, while not knowing each individual
vehicle’s data.
6. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we will evaluate the performance of the proposed PPTM scheme
in terms of computational costs of vehicles and RSU, and communication overhead of
vehicle-to-RSU and RSU-to-SP communications.
6.1. Computational Costs
For the proposed PPTM scheme, when a vehicle Vj generates an encrypted report
PIDj ||Yj ||Cj1||Cj2||TS||σj , it performs 2 exponentiation operations in Zn2 to calcu-
late Cj1 and Cj2, and 1 multiplication in G to build the vehicle’s signature σj . After
collecting vehicles’ reports, the RSU verifies the received reports with N + 1 pairing
operations. Besides, the RSU also aggregates vehicles’ reports to obtain the aggre-
gated route and speed information, which requires N − 1 multiplication operations.
However, since the multiplication operations in Zn2 is negligible compared with the
time-consuming exponentiation and pairing operations, the time costs can be omitted.
In addition, to generate the signature, it also performs 1 multiplication operation in
G. As for the SP, it needs to verify the aggregated data sent from the RSU and obtain
the aggregated data, which cost 1 pairing operation in G and 2 exponentiation oper-
ations in Zn2 respectively. Here, we use Cn, Ce, Cm to denote the computational cost
of an exponentiation operation in Zn2 , a pairing operation in G, and a multiplication
operation in G respectively. Then, the total computation costs for the vehicle, RSU,
and SP will be 2 ∗ Cn + Cm, (N + 1) ∗ Ce + Cm, and Ce + 2 ∗ Cn respectively.
Our proposed PPTM scheme enables each vehicle to embed its multiple speed into
one compressed data, and thus large computational costs can be saved. To compare
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Table 1: Comparison of computational complexity.
PPTM TRPM
Vehicle 2 ∗ Cn + Cm M ∗ Cn + Cm
RSU (N + 1) ∗ Ce + Cm (N + 1) ∗ Ce + Cm
SP Ce + 2 ∗ Cn Ce +M ∗ Cn
the efficiency of PPTM, a traditional approach denoted by TRPM is considered, which
encrypts every individual speed information at the corresponding road segment. Under
the same setting, a vehicle has to generateM ciphertexts, consumingM exponentiation
operations in Zn2 to perform the encryption. In addition, for the ciphertexts, the
vehicle is required to generate one signature, which needs 1 multiplication operation
in G. Thus, the total time costs will be M ∗ Cn + Cm. For the RSU, it performs
batch verification to authenticate the reports, which takes N + 1 pairing operations.
However, since the number of ciphertexts in TRPM is much more than that in PPTM,
i.e., (M ∗ N vs. M ∗ 2), the RSU has to perform more multiplication operations for
speed aggregation. Then, the RSU generates a signature and forwards it to the RSU,
which will executeM exponentiation operations to recover the aggregated speed in all
road segments. Thus, the total computational costs of an individual vehicle, the RSU,
and the SP will be M ∗ Cn +Cm, (N + 1) ∗ Ce + Cm, and Ce +M ∗ Cn respectively.
We list the computational costs of PPTM and TRPM in Table 1. In addition,
we conduct extensive experiments to compare the efficiency of our proposed PPTM
scheme, and all experiments are performed on a laptop with Intel Core i7-7600U CPU
and 16GB RAM. The security number of κ and κ1 are set as 1024 bits and 160 bits.
The experimental results indicate that each single multiplication operation in G takes
2 ms, each exponentiation operation in Zn2 takes 5 ms, and each pairing operation
in G costs 2 ms. To validate the efficiency of our proposed PPTM, we show the
computational costs in terms of road segments in Fig. 5, 6. From the figures, it is
obvious that our proposed PPTM scheme performs much better than the traditional
TRPM scheme in terms of the number of road segments, which demonstrates the
correctness of the complexity analysis in Table 1.
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Figure 5: Computational costs of ciphertexts generation in the vehicle side.
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Figure 6: Computational costs of average speed calculation in the SP side.
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Figure 7: Communication overhead of the vehicle in the vehicle-to-RSU communication.
6.2. Communication Overhead
We then analyze the communication overhead of the proposed scheme. Generally,
the communications of PPTM includes two parts, i.e., vehicle-to-RSU communication
and RSU-to-SP communication. For the vehicle-to-RSU communication, each individ-
ual vehicle generates its traffic report and transmits it to the RSU. Recall our previous
description, the vehicle’s report is defined as PIDj ||Yj ||Cj1||Cj2||TS||σj and the size
is Sv = |PIDj |+160+2048∗2+ |TS|+160, where the size of n and G are set as 1024
bits and 160 bits respectively. RSU is responsible to collect N reports in its coverage
region, thus the total communication cost for the RSU is SR = N ∗Sv. If we choose the
traditional TRPM scheme, each vehicle needs to generate a ciphertext with 2048-bits
for every road segment. Then, the total communication cost of vehicle-to-RSU will be
Sv = |PIDj |+ 160 + 2048 ∗M + |TS|+ 160. For comparison, we plot the bandwidth
costs of both schemes in Fig. 7, where the size of PIDj and |TS| are both set as
100-bits. From this figure, we can see our proposed PPTM scheme can greatly save
vehicles’ bandwidth costs.
We then consider the RSU-to-SP communication. In PPTM, RSU transmits the
aggregated report IDr||C1||C2||TS||σr to the SP, which costs SS = |IDr|+2048 ∗ 2+
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Figure 8: Communication overhead of the RSU in the RSU-to-SP communication.
|TS| + 160 bits. Alternatively, TRPM needs to forward each segment’s aggregated
report to the SP, which requires |IDr|+ 2048 ∗M + |TS|+ 160 bits. Under the same
setting, we compare the communication cost of both schemes in Fig. 8. As can be
seen, compared with the traditional TRPM scheme, our proposed PPTM scheme will
aslo significantly reduce the bandwidth costs in the RSU-to-SP communication.
7. Related Works
Recently, traffic monitoring has received considerable attention as it is important to
reduce fuel waste, air pollution, and improve drivers’ driving experience. By collecting
vehicles’ traffic information, the traffic conditions can be better identified. Based on
this, many schemes and applications have been proposed. However, the security and
privacy of vehicles are still major concerns [8, 23, 9, 22]. In fact, if drivers’ privacy is
not being strictly protected, they are usually reluctant to submit their data.
To realize privacy-preserving traffic monitoring, some schemes [6, 17, 14, 16] have
been proposed. For example, Chim et al. [6] presented a secure navigation scheme
which uses RSUs to guide vehicles in a distributed way. However, since all vehicles
can obtain a same master key, their scheme cannot defend against the insider attacks.
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By using vehicular cloud and zero-knowledge proof, Sur et al. [17] designed a secure
navigation approach. Nevertheless, the credentials cannot be reused, which introduces
more computational costs. In [14], Ni et al. realized real-time navigation by collecting
vehicles’ speed information. With the technology of randomizable signature, their
scheme achieves conditional privacy preservation. Rabieh et al. [16] further proposed
a privacy-preserving route reporting scheme. In their scheme, vehicles’ future routes
are collected, which would be used calculate the number of vehicles appearing in next
routes.
Although many efforts have been made to realize privacy-preserving traffic moni-
toring, most of them, nevertheless, ignore the time link attack, as described in Fig. 1.
Since vehicles are required to report their driving reports periodically or at different
road segments, by linking their arriving time, vehicles’ trajectories can be easily iden-
tified. That is, the traditional technologies to protect drivers’ identity privacy, such
as pseudonyms or randomizable signature, are not suitable in certain VANET-based
applications. Inspired by the work in [11], we designed to use the super-increasing
sequence to aggregate vehicles’ routes and speed information. By this way, vehicles’
identity and location privacy is preserved.
8. Conclusion
Vehicles’ speed information is important to monitor the traffic conditions and pre-
vent road congestion, which however threat drivers’ privacy. In this paper, we propose
a privacy-preserving traffic monitoring scheme by collecting vehicles’ speed and route
information. The main idea is to aggregate multiple speed into one compressed data
so that vehicles’ identity and location privacy will not be disclosed. Security analysis
indicates that the proposed PPTM scheme is secure and privacy-preserving. Besides,
extensive simulations demonstrate its efficiency. In the future, we will try to achieve
privacy-preserving traffic monitoring without the assistance of the RSU.
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